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Yes. I know. You’ve heard this before.   
Every generation or two, some rhetorician wants to put on a lab coat 
and declare rhetoric a science. Herb Simons (1978) wrote a paper with a 
similar title at the very beginnings of the rhetoric of science movement, 
and Alan Gross (1993) has weighed in as well. A hundred years before 
them, David J. Hill wrote a textbook entitled The Science of Rhetoric: An 
Introduction to the Laws of Effective Discourse, suggesting that suasion 
worked pretty much like gravity. We can go further back. A nineteenth 
century biographer of Aristotle, Anonymous, dates “the science of 
rhetoric” to our very disciplinary origins, to Aristotle, who founded the 
field on “scientific principles,” in striking contrast to the loose 
unmethodical approach of Isocrates, who “professed to teach [rhetoric] by 
mere practice in the schools, as boxing and fencing might be learnt” 
(“Aristotle,” p. 144). We’ve been down this road before. 
But.  
Anonymous has a point. Among the many streams in the rhetorical 
tradition, there are prominent, divergent courses between the impulse to 
understand persuasion and the impulse to achieve persuasion, and those 
two motives date to the very first writings in the field.1 Aristotle and 
Isocrates were animated by both impulses, of course. The division is not 
as clean and absolute as Anonymous would have it, nor as I am 
adumbrating in these very brief observations. But Anonymous is clearly 
right that the Aristotelian approach, framed by the man who did so much 
to anchor the core empirical and formal enterprises that now wear the 
term science so comfortably—physics, biology, geology—is oriented more 
fully toward understanding, and, for that reason, has a higher claim on 
that god-term, science.  
Now, we all know that the various and scattered moves to propagate 
the colligation science of rhetoric have been somewhat less successful 
                                                        
1 I certainly don’t mean by this that the two enterprises shaped by these 
impulses—rhetoric docens and rhetoric utens—do not mutually inform each 
other, only that they may be, and frequently are, pursued independently (or, 
more accurately, since it is impossible that the one does not implicate the other, 
that they are pursued with one heavily dominant, the other heavily subordinate). 
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than for the reverse colligation, rhetoric of science. There is no ASTR, no 
Association for the Science and Technology of Rhetoric. What’s different 
now? What snake oil is Harris selling?  
The cognitive sciences.  
What I propose, in this brief position paper, is to (1) warrant the sub-
field, cognitive rhetoric, and (2) connect this sub-field to rhetoric of 
science, while simultaneously (3) reconfiguring Kenneth Burke, and (4) 
riding shamelessly on the coattails of Jeanne Fahnestock. 
Cognitive rhetoric, in its fundaments, begins with Kenneth Burke, 
though its presence has clearly been felt at least as far back as Hesiod, 
whose princes made sorrows disappear with their sweet flowing speech; 
or as Gorgias, who likened the psychological results of suasive tools to the 
physiological effect of the pharmacopoeia; or as Plato, who complained 
that certain forms of speech appealed to the mind as tasty food to the 
tongue. Physiology is never far away when these aspects of language—
affect, delight, enchantment—are commended or condemned. Burke, who 
shared the concerns of the ancients for the medicinal as well as the toxic 
aspects of rhetoric, articulated a program resting on the axiom that the 
form signification assumes profoundly affects the way human organisms 
respond to it.  
In a language of “human appetites” and aesthetic “desires” (1931, pp. 
34-35), Burke charted the semiotic factors that shape the response of 
humans to language and symbol systems generally.2 He was 
uncomfortable with absolutes, and the terministic apparatus of cognitive 
science post-dates his work in these areas by decades, but he makes the 
point penetratingly in this well-travelled passage from Grammar of 
Motives that there is something “universal” about certain structures of 
signification: 
                                                        
2 If we were to adopt a fully Burkean terminology for this project, we would have 
to call it “cognitive grammar,” since he locates this area of his research in “formal 
considerations logically prior to both the rhetorical and the psychological” (1969 
[1945], p. xviii). But, (1) cognitive grammar is already taken, by an intriguingly 
overlapping but very differently oriented framework, in linguistics; and (2) 
Burke’s use of rhetoric (as revealed in all of his work, but most expressly 
identified in Rhetoric of motives) is utterly dependent on the “universal 
resources of verbal placement” (1969 [1950], p. 22)— that is, on style—which he 
identifies with grammar. His relevant work is also chronologically prior to the 
cognitive revolution. The later stages of Burke’s career overlapped with that (still 
ongoing) revolution, but the positions in his work I am drawing on pre-date it by 
several decades. In that period, his direct contact with psychology (virtually 
everyone’s direct contact with psychology) engaged either psychoanalysis or 
behaviorism. The first Burke found amenable with certain currents of motivation, 
but did not link them to his “grammar.” The second he never tired of attacking 
(an attitude adopted by the first wave of cognitivists—George Miller, Jerome 
Bruner, Noam Chomsky). Like those early cognitivists, he regarded behaviorism 
as an exclusively zoological enterprise, whose results had nothing of consequence 
to say about the human mind. For Burke (in a position advocated by the 
cognitivists, in apparent ignorance of Burke’s arguments), the unbreachable 
divide was the human use of symbols (see especially, 1966, p. 3ff). 
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[Certain patterns of signification invite our participation because 
they] awaken an attitude of collaborative expectancy in us. For 
instance, imagine a passage built about a set of oppositions (“we do 
this, but they on the other hand do that; we stay here; but they go 
there; we look up, but they look down,” etc.) Once you grasp the trend 
of the form, it invites participation regardless of the subject matter. 
Formally, you will find yourself swinging along with the succession of 
antitheses, even though you may not agree with the proposition that is 
being presented in this form. ... [A] yielding to the form prepares for 
assent to the matter identified with it. Thus, you are drawn to the 
form, not in your capacity as a partisan, but because of some 
“universal” appeal in it. (Burke, 1969 [1945], p. 58) 
Burke shows very clearly here how swinging along with the form provides 
a rhythm that can easily get us swinging along with the proposition. It 
awakens an attitude of collaboration with the rhetor, very much like a 
dance, in which we step and sway as the rhetor directs us; collaborating, 
but asymmetrically: led. Burke’s concern, very much like Plato’s, is that 
being directed in a series of movements by the “form” will get us moving 
with the “matter” as well. The collaboration is really a highly inequitable 
faux collaboration; puppetry might make a better analogy than dance.   
The question Burke opens up here is: how do minds function when 
they are exposed to the traditional furniture of rhetoric—patterns of 
concepts and patterns of sounds; in a word, style. What are the sources of 
the “universal” appeal that Burke charts? What is it about the human 
organism that resonates to successions and to oppositions, and even more 
fully to successions of oppositions? And to the other collective factors in 
this passage, left unmentioned by Burke? Let’s take the charting a bit 
further: 
• we do this, but they on the other hand do that; 
• we stay here; but they go there; 
• we look up, but they look down; 
It is quickly clear that succession and opposition are not the only 
“universal resources of verbal placement” (Burke, 1969 [1950], p. 22) the 
passage deploys. Parallelism is also at work here. Both the succession and 
the opposition, which mutually reinforce each other, are further bolstered 
by synchronized rhythmic repetitions. Brute lexical repetition adds 
another factor to the rhetorical (or “grammatical”) pull of the passage, 
with the three we’s, the three they’s, pivoted by the three but’s, and joined 
by two do’s, two look’s. Phonological repetition lends a hand, partially 
entailed by the lexical repetitions (same words, same sounds), partially 
augmented by the number of vowels and consonants that make repeat 
appearances in different words. There are also conceptual repetitions 
galore, in the precisely repeated words themselves (same words, same 
concepts), but also in the pairs of antonyms, each of which references the 
same semantic domain—down repeats vertical direction, referenced by 
up; there repeats spatial proximity to the rhetor, referenced by here; that 
repeats relative-valence-to-rhetor, referenced by this. Formal location is 
also important to the passage, as the repetitions, both syntactically and 
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lexically, concentrate in certain places, mostly beginnings (of phrases or 
words), but also middles. Equally crucial, as well, is that all of these verbal 
resources are (temporally and/or spatially) proximal to one another. The 
fact that the oppositions are cheek-by-jowl increases their salience (and, 
of course, the same is true for the repetitions).  
Compare, for instance, this succession of antithetical propositions: 
• we do this, and we stay here; 
• but they go there and we look up; 
• they on the other hand do that, and they look down. 
If not for the counter-example of an infinite number of PowerPoint 
presentations, one would almost be tempted to abandon bullets here; the 
phrasing has fallen so dramatically out of sync. This slight rearrangement 
causes so much verbal dissonance that these pairings do not easily belong 
side-by-side. We still have “a set of oppositions” here, in Burke’s 
description. The specific oppositional pairings, along with the overall 
thematic we/they division, can certainly be reconstructed, and form 
inevitably plays a substantial role in pointing the way to such a 
reconstruction (the similarity of the deictics, and of the prepositions, and 
the identity of full-court repetitions, all exert strong forces of adhesion 
here). But there is much less of the waltz in this second version, much 
more of something like hide-and-seek; less collaboration, more wrangle. 
(Correspondingly, Burke might point out, there is less danger of being 
pushed and pulled around the rhetor’s dance floor.)  
The factors at work in Burke’s passage—repetition, contrast, 
parallelism (a particular order of repetition), position, and proximity 
(along with a few others, like symmetry, similarity, and transitivity)—are 
the staples of rhetorical style. The instances of these factors in Burke’s 
little example all have venerable names: antithesis, isocolon, assonance, 
alliteration, epanaphora, mesodiplosis . . . Burke’s collaborative 
expectancy, in short, is built out of rhetorical figures.  
Here is my cognitive claim, then: rhetorical figures operate in the 
grooves of the mind. But not only figures: topoi (which Fahnestock has 
shown to bear systematic correspondences to figures), narrative (which is 
a kind of  ‘succession’ in Burke’s terms, and which allows for a wide array 
plot “curves” through interaction with other factors, like opposition and 
progression), syllogisms (which are inconceivable without semantic 
repetition and transitivity)—in sum, the whole assortment of verbal and 
semiotic resources involved in human “efforts to discover and share 
warrantable assent” (Booth, 1971, p. 106). Rhetoric. Is. Cognitive.  
What is new here, you ask? Burke was, after all, working on these 
ideas in the twenties and thirties. But Burke was working with a wholly 
untethered notion of universality. That’s one of the reasons he puts 
universal in safety-quotes in the passage above. In the last five decades, 
however, the cognitive sciences have developed a variety of frameworks 
for investigating the shared structures of brain and of mind that define 
the human organism. Unsurprisingly, there are compelling overlaps 
among these frameworks and Burkean formalism.  
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The most celebrated of these overlaps (including in much philosophy 
of science) is similarity; or, as it is so widely known in such studies, 
metaphor. But all four of the “master tropes” in one of Burke’s set pieces 
(1969 [1941], pp. 503-517), have received cognitive attention, chiefly 
among linguists. Schemes, with even more striking cognitive implications, 
have gone unnoticed, and present very rich research possibilities. We 
know, for instance, that the brain operates at the most elemental level on 
repeated neural firings, in repetitive constellations. Repetition is one of 
the most pervasive aspects of schemes (and some tropes). We know that 
edges are important perceptually, to the cognitive systems of vision and 
audition especially. Visual boundaries between objects and non-objects 
and auditory boundaries between notes and between speech phones are 
zones of special salience. Schemic activity, as we have seen in Burke’s 
we/they passage, clusters at the boundaries of phrases (epanaphora and 
epistrophe, most obviously, but also mesodiplosis, which regularly marks 
the junctions between phrases) and words (alliteration is at the 
beginnings of words, rhyme usually at the end); theories of arrangement 
stress beginnings and ends of speeches, and transitions between sections.  
The research potentials in cognitive rhetoric are very broad. Cross-
cultural rhetoric, for instance, can be central in exploring these “universal 
resources,” uncovering the different instantiations the factors play in the 
aesthetic and suasive regimes of different languages and cultures. 
Developmental rhetoric—as far as I know, a wholly imaginary (sub-) 
discipline—is tremendously ripe. Anybody with more than ten seconds 
exposure to children knows that they thrive on repetition. But how does it 
manifest? When does analogic reasoning appear? Is personification 
linked to Theory of Mind? Apostrophe? Irony? Degenerative rhetoric—
also currently a figment of my imagination—is equally ripe, and perhaps 
more urgent. Do repetitions, schemic placements, and rhythmic 
intonations aid dementia patients in understanding or retention? Do 
Broca’s syndrome patients retain the ability to recognize metaphors? Do 
Wernicke’s syndrome patients lose it?  
Where is science in all of this? In part, it is embedded in the 
methodologies necessary to explore some aspects of cognitive rhetoric. 
Hence, the science of rhetoric, which can help ensure, as Gross observed 
in 1993, that the results of our field begin to add up, rather than just pile 
up (p. 29). (It may also be worth pointing out at this node in the 
discussion that incorporating scientific methods, generating scientifically 
ratified results, publishing in scientifically sanctioned journals, would not 
hurt the ethotic appeals of rhetoricians seeking to work with scientists.) 
Where, then, is the rhetoric of science? What is the relevance of 
cognition to the rhetorical exploration of science? We need look no 
further than our esteemed colleague, Jeanne Fahnestock, whose 
Rhetorical Figures in Scientific Argumentation and related publications 
(1999; 2003, 2004a,b, as a sampling), elaborates a masterful program for 
the investigation of scientific argumentation in figural terms. After 
Fahnestock published the book, I wrote a mostly appreciative review. The 
book is magnificent. But I had a petty and ill-founded complaint to make 
as well. I quote myself (I could paraphrase, but quotation is better for my 
citation indices):  
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[. . . much laudation . . .] Professor Fahnestock does not, however, 
walk on water. This book has one serious shortcoming, to my eyes, 
which prevents it from being truly groundbreaking. Aside from 
metaphor, figuration has long been little more than an embarrassing 
reminder of the shallowest notions of style for almost everybody, 
including most rhetoricians. But (aside from the appreciation for 
metaphor) this is utterly backwards. Figuration runs as deep as it is 
possible to run. Language cannot but be figured; it flows in what 
Edward Sapir figured as “well-worn grooves of expression” (1921, p. 
89). These grooves can be optimized to aesthetic or rhetorical ends 
(or, often, both)—which is where formal theories of figuration come 
in—but there are no other channels. Figures are the very stuff of 
language, the bones and muscles, nerves and skin, blood and guts. 
They are the very opposite of, in Plato’s famous assault, the “colours, 
and enamels, and garments” (Gorgias, 465c3) daubed on, and painted 
on, and draped over an otherwise pallid, and virtuous, and naked 
language. Fahnestock sees the linguistic ineluctability of figures truly 
and argues it clearly. She vitiates all approaches to figuration in which 
“one begins with a plain message and then adds secondary features 
that make it more memorable or convincing than it would be without 
them” (p. 21). But—sorry for taking so long; here is my complaint—she 
unaccountably pulls up halt before the inevitable next step. Figures 
are the stuff of language. Language is profoundly cognitive. Throw 
modus ponens into the breach and you’ve got: figuration is cognitive. 
(Harris, 1999, p. 92) 
I ended the review with the most reprehensible of my complaints, 
“Fahnestock missed the boat” (p. 103). It was certainly not her job, 
especially in a book that does so much else, so brilliantly, to integrate that 
work with the voluminous multidisciplinary research that constitutes 
cognitive science. But she was gracious enough to respond not as the 
remark deserved. She did something quite wonderful. 
She sifted through a great deal of that voluminous research (2005), 
identifying several important points of contact, and sketching a research 
approach of reciprocal support. She proposes, first, that cognitive science 
needs to be informed by a figuratively rich “rhetorical theory of language” 
(p. 174) in place of the arhetorical generative theories that have been the 
staple of cognitive science for most of its existence. She is exactly right in 
this. Cognitive science does need rhetoric.4 And she suggests, second, that 
rhetoricians need to be open “to potential scientific grounding,” 
reminding us that rhetoric always, in the end, “come[s] down to human 
brains acting on human brains” (p. 175).  
                                                        
3 See www.mylibrarybook.com/books/831/Plato/Gorgias-16.html. 
4 In fact, there is a growing opening in exactly this area, in the linguistic 
framework I invoked above, Cognitive Linguistics. It founds itself on Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1980) Metaphors We Live By, extending their approach to a few 
select tropes (see, for instance, the journal, Cognitive Linguistics, published by 
Mouton de Gruyter). What this line of research shows is how much they could 
benefit from collaborating with rhetoricians. 
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What makes this cognitive grounding especially crucial for the 
rhetoric of science is exactly what makes the rhetoric of science the crucial 
occupation it is in the first place. Science is where human brains (and 
their associated perceptual and mechanical systems) make the most 
robust, most hopeful, most dangerous constellations of knowledge that 
human brains can make. Science is what calls the tune for most of our 
dances.  
The position that the form of signification profoundly affects the 
response of human organisms is well known in the history and philosophy 
of science, perhaps most closely associated with Gerald Holton’s work on 
themata (1973). Signification that comes in simpler packages, or comes 
with greater implications, or comes with closer integration to already 
accepted significations, is more attractive to those human organisms we 
call scientists. They are more likely to call it true, to add it to their 
repertoires, to deploy it in the making of artificial organs and renewable 
energy devices and environmental poisons and weapons of mass 
destruction. The more we understand the elemental components of that 
knowledge (deeper and more pervasive than Holton’s themata), the more 
we can chart its reliance on the kind of wetware that defines us as human 
organisms, the better equipped we will be to influence and educate the 
culture that defines us as social, political, historical, organisms.  
I am not claiming there are laws of suasion, as Hill did, in my appeal 
to a science of rhetoric, only that cognitive science has immense promise 
as a pillar in a new twenty-first century rhetoric docens, for 
understanding science as an epistemological extension of human 
organisms. 
Afterword: Displacement, Condensation, and 
Response 
I did not read this paper at the ARST pre-conference. Rather, I sketched 
out my ideas along the following lines, starting with a disavowal of my 
title.  
I deliberately chose a somewhat asinine title to get people talking. I 
have no pretensions for, or real interest in, charting out a program of 
study that brings the machinery of science to rhetoric in any pervasive or 
systemic way. In any case, it’s not the overlaps or intersections with 
science that makes these ideas compelling to me. It’s their deep 
explanatory capacity. 
So, stripping that away, what are my claims? 
I claim that there is a range of cognitive affinities that underlie the 
aesthetic and suasive characteristics of semiosis. These affinities include 
similarity, contrast, association, scale (increase and decrease), edge-
detection, parallelism, symmetry, and repetition. They should sound 
familiar. They correlate with topoi. They undergird figures. They 
comprise style. They shape thought and belief, learning and memory and 
argumentation.  
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At its most powerful, discourse that activates one or more of these 
affinities has a kind of deja-vu feel to it that Burke calls “collaborative 
expectancy.” The structure and trajectory of some configurations are so 
familiar that you know where they are going before they get there. You get 
there first, and impatiently wait for the rhetor. It’s your discourse. The 
rhetor is only speaking it. An example Burke cites from the rhetorical 
climate of 1948 is: 
Who controls Berlin, controls Germany; who controls Germany 
controls Europe; who controls Europe controls the world. 
“As a proposition, it may or may not be true,” Burke comments. “But 
regardless of [our] doubts about it as a proposition, by the time [we] 
arrive at the second of its three stages, [we] feel how it is destined to 
develop and on the level of purely formal assent [we] … collaborate to 
round out its symmetry by spontaneously willing its completion and 
perfection as an utterance” (Burke, 1969 [1945], pp. 57-58). 
What gives it this character; or, rather, what gives us this character, 
when we hear such constructions? The shape of our minds; the affinities 
we have for, in this case, repetition (who controls, controls, Berlin) edge 
detection (the repetitions occur at phrase boundaries), parallelism 
(syntactic and prosodic repetitions), and scale (the semantic scope of the 
direct objects increases).  
Now, the reason we bring rhetorical theory and criticism to science is 
because we recognize there is something important and powerful about 
scientific discourse. When we can bring our rhetorical approaches to 
science, we bring them to the most potent and ubiquitous discourse of the 
age.  
Let’s take a quick look at how pervasive these cognitive affinities are, 
by way of two symbols in the central formula of Gregor Mendel’s (1866) 
“Experiments on Plant Hybrids.”  
 
Repetition is present in abundance, most significantly in the two 
variables (A, a), which illustrates how fundamental it is to mathematical 
and logical reasoning. If one wants to reference and manipulate the 
relations among identical concepts or multiple iterations of identical 
concepts, ‘lexical’ repition is invetiable; figuratively, this is ploche. 
Similarity is also prominent (A & a). When variation along a 
controlled dimension is important, similarity of symbol or structure 
Figure 1 
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evokes that variation; figures such as polyptoton and homeoteleuton are 
operate on theme-and-variation similarity. Another aspect of similarity 
(this one less prevalent in mathematics, more specific to Mendel’s 
argument) is in the relative upper-case/lower-case correlation with the 
‘magnitude’ of the effect. The upper-case letter signals the dominant trait, 
the lower case, recessive; the figural corollary is onomatopoeia.  
Opposition is crucial to Mendel’s formula (A & a), in slightly more 
subtle ways, since the dominant and recessive traits are necessarily in the 
same genetic (or, better, semantic) ‘space.’ The expression of one trait is 
exclusive to the expression of the other; figuratively, we have antithesis.  
Symmetry plays perhaps the definitive role in the formula, because 
it demonstrates the experimental design. Mendel is showing, with the 
inverted parallelism of the second and third elements (A/a and a/A), that 
all possible combinations of dominant and recessive character traits from 
the two sources (seed and pollen) have been included; figuratively, this is 
antimetabole.5 
Mendel’s formula, and the paper that frames it, was not immediately 
successful. But it became so compelling as to define an entirely new 
branch of science fifty years hence. It is a classic example of suasion 
deferred. By looking at the formula in light of cognitive affinities, we can 
see more clearly the reasoning and invention in Mendel’s experimental 
design.  
The “Horizons of Possibility” panel, and the entire ARST 
preconference, was helpful to me in sharpening my thinking about many 
of these issues, and the suite of position papers and responses will 
continue to be an important resource for me in future work. The caliber of 
work in this field generally, and by the particular players at this pre-
conference, always impresses me. I am especially thankful to Leah 
Ceccarelli and Carl Herndl for their vision of other possibilities in rhetoric 
of science and technology, and for sharing the panel with me; and to John 
Angus Campbell, Carolyn R. Miller, and Lynda Walsh for the helpful 
scrutiny they turned on my arguments specifically. I do want to quell the 
fears of Walsh and Miller somewhat, however.  
Of all the people in the world I didn’t think Plato would have to fear, 
Carolyn R. Miller would have been at the top of my list, but here she is in 
her response paper: “the ultimate promise of cognitive rhetoric is that we 
can learn to use form to control humans. This has been the rhetorical 
dream” (Miller, this issue). Er, no. This has been the rhetorical nightmare. 
The ultimate promise of propaganda, and in its scientistic version, 
neuromarketing, is to use form to control humans. The ultimate promise 
of rhetoric is to inoculate humans against such control. Walsh offers a 
similar picture of my approach, when she writes, “Let’s say we 
                                                        
5 This survey of affinities in Mendel’s formula are from an article currently in 
review, “Figural Logic in Gregor Mendel’s ‘Experiments on Plant Hybrids.’” As 
the title suggests, the paper is deeply influenced by Jeanne Fahnestock’s work. 
James Wynn’s research on Mendel (2007, 2012) was also very important to my 
arguments in that paper.  
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operationalized it so that we could predict the positions of stakeholder 
groups and the outcome of public science policy debates with 95% 
accuracy”  (Walsh, this issue). 
The point of researching the cognitive underpinnings from a 
rhetorical perspective, especially one so deeply rooted in Kenneth Burke, 
is not to predict and manipulate, but to understand, to align that 
understanding with the ethical awareness Miller calls for, and to use that 
alignment in ways that improve society, prominently including science.  
 Look, Carolyn, Linda, and anyone else who shares these concerns: in 
labs all over the world there are subjects strapped into fMRI scanners 
right now by marketing people and political strategists. Lies are being 
tested. Cortical real estate is lighting up. We won’t stop the testing by 
simply declaring all (neuro-)cognitive rhetoric is inherently bad or 
immoral. Luckily, I’m pretty sure the neuromarketing research is 
misguided and simplistic. No one even knows what it means for cortical 
real estate to flicker briefly. But, to the extent that these people do find 
tools of manipulation based on the structure of the mind and the wiring of 
the brain, we are the folks who should be able to understand, resist, and 
counter the strategies they develop. In any case, it would surely “be a 
mistake,” as a recent overview of neuroscience and persuasion in this 
journal pointed out, “to ignore the materiality of bodies in the 
constitution of perception” (Gruber, Jack, Keränen, McKenzie, & Morris, 
2011, p. 4). 
And, one final note. Miller calls in her response paper for increased 
attention to digital communicative technologies in rhetoric of science, a 
call I heartily endorse. Cognitive rhetoric has much to offer in this realm. 
These technologies reflect the secondary orality that Walter Ong and 
Marshall McLuhan talked about in their work on the electronic age, to a 
far greater degree than does television, perhaps even than does radio. 
Figures are the original technology of distributed cognition. They have 
such a presence in oral literature, in proverbs, heuristics, and rules of 
thumb, because they have a cognitive stickiness. Print culture put 
pressure on overt figuration in many ways, because the page is an 
external technology of distributed cognition that utilizes visual modes of 
representation (many of which, as the Gestalt principles demonstrate, 
reflect the same affinities—repetition, similarity, contrast). With the 
advent of Twitter, Tumblr, Facebook, and other fragmentary media—
where science is getting done—they may be coming to fore again. Look, 
for instance, at how many figures show up in Facebook shares and tweet 
propagations.  
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